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THE CAUSE, EFFECT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSEQUENCE OF UNEQUAL FUNDING:
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION

In 1986 and 1987, wealthy school districts in Illinois spent four
times more per student than poor districts, thereby ranking Illinois
sixth in the nation for disparate educational funding systems.' In
1990, parents and students from forty-seven school districts challenged the state's funding system 2 by filing suit in the Circuit Court
of Cook County. The complaint alleged three separate violations of
the Illinois Constitution, including the education article, equal protection clause, and due process clause.3 The circuit court granted
1. This data compares the richest 10% of Illinois school districts with the
poorest 10% of Illinois school districts. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF EDUC., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1990).
2. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 (1991)) establishes
the public school system in Illinois. See infra notes 144-61 and accompanying
text, discussing the current method of funding in Illinois.
3. Committee for Educ. Rights v. Jim Edgar, No. 90 Ch. 11097 (Cook
County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 1990) (order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss), appeal docketed, No. 92-2379 (1st Dist. July 20, 1992). In Committee for
EducationalRights, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the present statutory
scheme in Illinois violates three provisions of the Illinois Constitution: the education article, the equal protection clause, and the no-special-law article. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 53-57,
Committee for Educ. Rights v. Jim. Edgar, No. 90 Ch. 11097 (Cook County Cir.
Ct. filed Nov. 13, 1990) (order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss), appeal
docketed, No. 92-2379 (1st Dist. July 20, 1992) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint].
For similar constitutional challenges in both state and federal courts, see,
e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988); Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265 (1986); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.
1982); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285
S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711
(Mich. 1973); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Opinion of the Justices, 387 A.2d 333 (N.H. 1978); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359
(N.J. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Britt v. North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 361
S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); Board of Educ. v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v.
State of Oregon, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa.
1979); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State of Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v.
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the defendant's motion to dismiss, and now the plaintiffs have ap4
pealed the case to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District. If
the appellate court finds a constitutional violation, the Illinois General Assembly would be required to examine alternative funding
methods and to adopt a new financing scheme tailored to comply
with the Illinois Constitution. The present funding system raises
constitutional issues not only because of its social and economic impact, but also because of education's critical role in the political
process.
One of the state's most important functions is to educate its citizens. 5 Education provides the opportunity for people to succeed in
life.6 However, the level of funding a school district receives directly affects the quality and quantity of educational services a
school district can offer. 7 Because local property taxes primarily
fund the public school system s wealthier school districts produce
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
4. Committee for Educ. Rights v. Jim Edgar, No. 90 Ch. 11097 (Cook
County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 1990) (order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss), appeal docketed, No. 92-2379 (1st Dist. July 20, 1992).
5. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text, discussing the importance
education holds in our political structure and way of life.
6. "[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship ....
In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1953).
7. See infra notes 15-19 discussing the importance of education to the
political process. Counts 138-60 of the complaint filed in the Illinois suit outline
concrete examples of how the differences in funding create differences in educational services. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 3843. The neighboring districts of Mt. Morris Community Unit School District
and Byron Community Unit School District have substantially the same property values, except that the Byron School District benefits from the Commonwealth Edison nuclear facility built within its boundaries. Id. at 40. The Byron
school district, at a tax rate of 2.1%, produces $10,085 per student, whereas the
Mt. Morris school district, at a tax rate of 4.14%, produces only $3,483 per student. Id. at 39.
The following is a comparison of the difference in the number of courses
offered by the high schools in the Byron and Mt. Morris school districts:
Type of Course
Byron
Mt. Morris
Agriculture
9
0
Business
16
9
Career Education
10
0
Computer
5
1
English
25
16
Gifted Students
10
0
Home Economics
11
6
Industrial Arts
22
12
Id. at 40-42.
In addition, Byron High School offered a total of 187 courses while Mt.
Morris offered only 113. Id.
8. Local property taxes in 1986 and 1987 accounted for $3,634,200,000 or
50.9% of total school district revenues. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint,
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significantly more funds per student than poor school districts, with
less tax effort.9 Such disparities result in wealthier districts employing more teachers with advanced degrees,' 0 paying their teachers considerably higher salaries," and producing students with
12
higher average scores on standardized tests.
Public school systems in Illinois are dedicated to the "educau3
tional development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.'
To meet this goal, Illinois must eliminate disparaties by restructuring the current system of funding. The Illinois General Assembly
must carefully consider alternative methods of funding and choose
a course of action that will not only be workable today, but will
continue to evolve, providing all children with the maximum educational resources possible.
Part I of this Note will focus on the overall importance of education in American society and will discuss how the level of funding
impacts the educational development of students. Part II will set
forth the background of the constitutional challenge upon disparate
funding systems in both the federal and state courts. Part III will
supra note 3, at 22. Other local sources, such as proceeds from bond issuances
and the Corporate Personal Property Tax Replacement Fund, account for an
additional 7.9% of total school district revenues. Id. State sources of revenue in
1986 and 1987 accounted for 33.9% of total school district revenues, and federal
sources accounted for 7.3% of total school district revenues. Id. In some counties, property taxes supply almost all of the school district's budget. In DuPage
County, for example, 86.5% of the school budget comes from local property
taxes, 11.8% comes from state aid, and 1.7% comes from federal aid. Casey
Banas, Poll Finds Backingfor FundingChanges, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 1991, § 2, at
3.
9. Wealthier school districts, where property values are high, raise substantially more funds than poorer school districts. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF
EDUC., PERFORMANCE PROFILES: ILLINOIS SCHOOLS REPORT TO THE PUBLIC,
SCHOOL REPORT CARD OF 1989 18 (1990) [hereinafter SCHOOL REPORT CARD OF

1989].

Equalized Assessed Valuation (EAV) denotes the assessed value of real

property subject to taxation by the school districts. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 10. EAV per student adequately measures the relative
wealth of a school district. SCHOOL REPORT CARD OF 1989, supra,at 11. See also
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 15.
10. The following data compares the top 25% of school districts in EAV per
student with the bottom 25% of school districts in EAV per student. SCHOOL
REPORT CARD OF 1989, supra note 9, at vi. At the elementary level, 44% of
teachers in wealthier districts held master's degrees as compared to 38% in poor
districts. Id. at vii. Additionally, at the high school level, 69% of teachers held
master's degrees and above in wealthier districts as compared to 38% in poor
districts. Id.
11. See SCHOOL REPORT CARD OF 1989, supra note 9, at vii (stating, "The
differences in average teacher salaries between rich and poor school districts
were approximately $5,800 at the elementary level and $12,000 at the high
school level.").
12. The standardized tests were comprised of both the IGAP (Illinois Goal
Assessment Program) mathematics and reading assessment tests, and the ACT
(American College Testing program) college placement test. SCHOOL REPORT
CARD OF 1989, supra note 9, at vi.
13. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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delineate the approach taken by the plaintiffs in the Illinois suit to
declare the financing method in Illinois unconstitutional. Part IV
will then discuss alternative methods of funding. Finally, Part V
will conclude by proposing that the Illinois General Assembly adopt
a public school system fully funded by the state.
I.

SOCIAL POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO UNEQUAL PUBLIC
SCHOOL FUNDING

The quality of a child's education directly impacts two important aspects of American society: the operation of the political process and the potential for mobility between the social classes.
Quality of education is not solely a function of money. Contrasting
socioeconomic realities between the richer and poorer communities
also affect educational opportunities. While opponents of equal educational funding argue that crime, poverty, complacency and the
inability to educate poor minorities are the causes of inferior education, 14 this section argues that these factors are actually the result
of an inferior education. Additionally, this section argues that since
the state has direct control over funding, equalizing expenditures
may be the only effective means to combat such social problems.
A.

Education, the PoliticalProcess, and Social Mobility

In the United States, education plays a significant role in the
operation of the government. In an effective democracy, the people
must elect their representatives based upon an understanding of
the policies which those representatives endorse. 15 If people lack
the basic skills needed to make an informed choice in electing their
representatives, the political process breaks down.16 In addition,
education plays a vital role in the free exercise of fundamental
rights. 17 For example, the ability to effectively petition the govern14. See infra notes 29-36 for sources addressing why some students fail and
why educators may choose to point a finger at factors out of their control.
15. Many cases and commentators have recognized that education plays an
important political role in a democratic society. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court noted that education "is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces." 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1953); see also People of the State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing that
public education is "the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people."); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that "Americans regard the
public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government.").
16. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (stating that "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.... It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities.").
17. Thomas Jefferson stated that the population was entitled to enough education to read and write because basic literacy is necessary to render the gen-
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ment for redress of grievances gives substance and meaning to the
fundamental right of free speech.' 8 Consequently, education assures that people have the power necessary to exercise fundamental
rights central to a democratic government "by the people, and for
the people."' 19
In recognition of education's political importance, state-run
public school financing systems generally require a minimum level
20
If
of funding per student, called a foundation level of funding.
local property taxes fail to raise the minimum level of funding, the
state provides supplemental funds. 21 This type of "foundation
plan" attempts to provide each child with the basic skills necessary
22
to function in society.
However, independent of democratic needs, the level of a person's education directly affects his or her economic status. The average salary of a high school graduate exceeds that of a nongraduate, and the average salary of a college graduate exceeds that
of a high school graduate, and so on.23 The social and economic
mobility of a person in our society directly relates to the level and
24
type of education the person has attained.
eral populace capable of guarding its liberty. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the
More General Diffusion of Knowledge, in WRITINGS 365 (Merrill D. Peterson
ed., 1984).
18. Id.
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
20. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8(5) (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 188(5) (1991)); see also JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 64 (1970) (noting that a foundation plan "establishes a dollar level
(foundation) of spending per pupil which it guarantees to every district."). A
foundation program establishes a minimum dollar level which is required to
provide a student an adequate education. Id. The state guarantees this minimum funding level for each student provided that the local district complies
with a minimum property tax rate. Id. To preserve incentive, the local district
can raise property taxes in an effort to raise additional local revenues. Id. The
advantage to a foundation plan is that shifts in spending can take effect almost
immediately because of local control. Id. Additionally, it leaves parents with
apparent control over their children's education. Id.
21. COONS ET AL., supra note 20, at 64.
22. Id.
23. In 1986, the average salaries relative to the level of education attained
were as follows: a college graduate earned $33,443; a high school graduate
earned $19,844; and a person with no high school diploma earned $16,605. Carol
Kleiman, Higher LearningClearly Means HigherEarning,CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12,
1989, § Jobs, at 1.
In 1987, the average man with a graduate degree earned $41,700; the average man with a bachelor's degree earned $35,200; and the average high school
graduate earned $25,394. Education a Better Investment, UPI, Oct. 24, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES file.
24. In the United States, social status and economic status are essentially
synonymous because the U.S. Constitution restricts the power of Congress to
grant a title of nobility. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. However, distinct social
classes do exist in America, which in itself fuels a form of bigotry, especially in
the areas of educational opportunity. See Brian Mikulak, Cassism and Equal
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In the United States, the belief in equal opportunity 25 and the
notion that any person can achieve success, regardless of his social
or economic background, necessarily implies support for social and
economic mobility. 2 6 Funding schools with local property taxes attempts to facilitate the political process and also provides desired
local control. 27 However, the present funding system in Illinois actually inhibits social mobility by providing better educational opportunities 28 to children with wealthier parents and neighbors.
This bias toward maintaining the status quo and structuring success
as a function of one's neighborhood rather than a function of one's
intelligence, desire, and hard work is offensive to our value system.

B.

Socioeconomic Realities and Perceptions

However, unequal educational opportunities are not solely responsible for inhibiting social mobility.

Poorer communities are

further disadvantaged by other interdependent factors, namely soOpportunity: A Proposalfor Affirmative Action in Education Based on Social
Class, 33 How. L.J. 113, 120 (1990) (noting that children from "upper-class" families are more inclined to pursue higher education than their "lower-class"
counterparts).
25. Most Americans believe in equal opportunity as a basic foundation of
American law. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Equality Principle: A Foundation of American Law, 20 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 673, 678 (1987) (noting that "equal
justice under law, an immensely moral concept, is the very cornerstone of our
American concept of justice, and will remain so for as long as courts function in
its service.").
26. Social and economic mobility in America provide incentives to work
hard in hopes of attaining a more stable economic position. See John M. Jefferies & Richard McGahey, Equity, Growth and Socioeconomic Change: AntiDiscriminationPolicy in an Era of Economic Transformation,13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 233, 235 (1985) (citing David M. Potter, PEOPLE OF PLENTY:
ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE & THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1954)) (noting that social mobility and equal opportunity have a positive correlation).
Thomas Jefferson had a different point of view, believing "that true happiness does not depend upon increasing one's wealth or upon rising to a more
exalted social station." Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding:
the English, the Americans, and the Dialecticof FederalistConstitutionalJurisprudence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 106, 152 (1989). Instead, Jefferson believed that
"happiness depends upon making the best of one's abilities consistent with the
constraints imposed by the 'condition' in society to which one has been born."
Id.
27. Relying on local property taxes does have advantages: income does not
fluctuate with the economy as it would with income taxes or sales taxes, and the
availability of expenditure information to parents and the parents' ability to
protest makes local officials more responsive to the parents and their children's
needs than state officials. See Allen D. Schwartz, Illinois School Finance-A
Primer,56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 831, 838-39 (1980) (noting that if the state fully
funded state schools, "[liocal school boards, without control of their revenue,
would become functionaries of the state - responsive to broader state issues
rather than their local concerns.").
28. See supra notes 7-12, illustrating the differences in educational opportunities offered by wealthy school districts, as compared to poor school districts.
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cioeconomic realities and perceptions. 29 Social realities such as
higher rates of crime and accidents, high unemployment, racism,
absence of positive role models, and negative influence from peer
30
groups damper a person's incentive to work for a good education.
Additionally, social perceptions of the community inhibit an effective education in certain areas. For example, a child from a poorer
community must perceive himself as decidedly more intelligent and
more ambitious than his peers to take on studies that are not generally pursued within that school. 31 Further, this same child must
overcome the financial intimidation associated with the cost of an
education without being familiar with the end value of an expensive
degree. 32 These perceptions place an additional disadvantage on a
child from a poorer district compared to a child with identical intelligence from a wealthier district.
However, commentators have noted that beliefs held by professional educators are the real problem, rather than any deficiency in
the students' ability to learn and progress. 33 William J. Bennett,
former Secretary of Education, stated, "Educational achievement
by students comes from clear purpose, high expectations, strong
and persistent teaching, and hard work. But achievement can be
torpedoed by the idea that it is mostly a matter of luck, wealth, or
native ability, an idea altogether too prevalent in American education today. ' 34 School administrators and teachers holding these beliefs blame poor performance on the students, and on the unstated
assumption that factors such as race or class explain educational
failure. 35 This provides some educators with a reason to offer less
29. The social perceptions of a class of citizens consist of their assumptions,
beliefs and knowledge, contrasted against the assumptions, beliefs and knowledge of other social classes. See Mikulak, supra note 24, at 123 (noting that
children from "upper-class" families have higher expectations for themselves
than their "lower-class" counterparts because they have more confidence as a
result of their social mobility).
30.

WILLIAM J. BENNETT, DEPT. OF EDUC., AMERICAN EDUCATION: MAKING

33-34 (1988) (explaining factors contributing to the success or failure
of students).
31. For a persuasive hypothetical about how perceptions of children and
parents of different social classes inhibit children from less advantaged classes,
see Mikulak, supra note 24, at 125.
32. Id.
33. See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 33 (proposing that prevalent cultural
attitudes in American society affect not only the parents of socially limited children, but also the educators who teach those children).
34. See also Harold W. Stevenson, Child Development in Life-Span Perspective, in CULTURE AND SCHOOLING 257 (E. Mavis Hetherington et al. eds., 1988).
("The importance of hard work is diminished to the degree that parents believe
that native ability is a basis for accomplishment. Holding this belief.., provides
an excuse for offering some children less challenging curricula and making
fewer demands for their mastery of the material.").
IT WORK,

35.

See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 32 (noting that statistical information

showing that one-fifth of all American children live below the poverty level is
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challenging curricula and to make fewer demands of students with
a lower socioeconomic status. 36 Disparate funding provides additional excuses for these educators to blame poor student performance on factors "out of their control."
37
While the state has little direct control over these problemsP
the state does have direct control over financing public education.
Equalized financing is a sure way to directly increase the overall
quality of the public school system. 38 Increasing the quality of the
public school system may be the only way to affect positive changes
in society given the disintegration of traditional social values. In an
effort to turn the tide on diverging social classes, the Illinois public
school system should provide equal educational opportunities to all
its students throughout the state.
II.

THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK

Residents of poor school districts have challenged school funding systems on both the federal and state levels. 39 Challenges at the
federal level rely on the underlying principles of Brown v. Board of
Education.40 However, the United States Supreme Court seems unwilling to take control in an area traditionally considered to be the
state's responsibility. 41 In contrast, at the state level, reformers
often used as grounds for the assumption that "some children can't learn because their color, class or family background gets in the way.").
36. See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 34; see also Stevenson, supra note 34, at
257, for a discussion of educators' role in watering down the school curricula.
37. To possibly control or reverse the effects of these social perceptions, the
government could initiate an affirmative action program based on social and
economic class. See Mikulak, supra note 24, at 133 (stating that affirmative
action policies may be the only means of providing working class and lower
class individuals with the opportunity to obtain a college education). Section 23.71 of the Illinois School Code, in effect, attempts to mitigate this problem by
funding a pre-kindergarten for "children who because of their home and community environment are subject to such language, cultural, economic and like
disadvantages that they have been determined as a result of screening procedures to be at risk of academic failure. " 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3.71(b) (1993)
(ILL. REV. STAT. ch 122, para. 2-3.71(b) (1991)).
38. Improvements in administrative efficiency are also a related way to increase the apparent amount of money spent on facilities and services. However,
this topic is not within the scope of this Note, and thus will not be considered.
39. See supra note 3 for a listing of federal and state cases that have decided
constitutional issues involving education.
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. The Court eventually backed away from the implication in Brown that
education is a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution. See San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973) (holding that education is
not a fundamental right and that students who reside in poor school districts do
not constitute a suspect class); see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S.
450 (1988) (holding that an assessment of a fee for bus service did not deny
equal protection); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (holding that
local distributions of state funds attained from the local real estate sales did not
create a suspect class or involve a fundamental right); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
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have successfully used two methods of attack on disparate funding
systems. 42 This section will discuss the position taken by the
Supreme Court, the two methods of state constitutional attack, and
the successes and failures at the state level.
A.

The FederalPosition

The landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education43 held that
a state cannot segregate public schools on the basis of race.44 The
Court recognized not only that "the most basic public responsibilities" require an education, but also that a child cannot reasonably
45
be expected to succeed if denied the opportunity of an education.
The Court also noted that when a state chooses to provide an education to its citizens, it must make that education available on equal
terms to all children. 46 Although the Brown Court based its holding on the equal protection clause, it implied that education was a
fundamental right by stating that it "is a right which must be made
202 (1982) (holding that discrimination against school-aged children illegally admitted into this country only warranted application of an "intermediate" level
of scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny).
42. See infra notes 63-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two
methods of state constitutional attack developed in the state courts.
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1953). In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a consolidation of four cases in which African-American minors sought admission to
public schools on a nonsegregated basis. Id. at 487. In the four cases, laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race denied admission of African-American children to schools attended by Caucasian children. Id. at 487-88.
The plaintiffs alleged that this segregation denied the children equal protection
of the laws, and sought to overturn the "separate but equal" doctrine announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 488. The plaintiffs contended that the "separate but equal" doctrine,
which provided equal treatment when the state provided substantially equal
but "separate" facilities, was "not equal and could not be made equal." Id. The
Court, recognizing that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," held that segregation on the basis of race deprives African-American
children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 495.
44. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
45. Id. at 493. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of education in the following passage:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms.
46. Id.
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available to all on equal terms. '47
Riding on the implications of Brown, proponents of equal
school funding challenged state systems claiming that funding disparities violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 In San Antonio Independent School
Districtv. Rodriguez,49 parents from a poor school district in Texas
argued that education was a fundamental right, that the poor were
a suspect class, and that the Texas public school funding system
which relied heavily on local property taxes violated the Equal Pro50
tection Clause.

The Rodriguez Court held that education is not a fundamental
right under the U.S. Constitution and that "poor" people do not
constitute a suspect classification. 5 1 The Court additionally recognized education as an important interest in our democratic society, 52 and found that the Texas funding system provided its citizens
with the minimal skills required to exercise their rights and partici47. Id. The Supreme Court did not expressly state whether it considered
education a fundamental right, or whether the "separate but equal" legislation
denied equal protection because it discriminated against a specific class of citizens. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The Court held "that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. In its reasoning, the Court relied
extensively on the psychological impact on the African-American children
along with unequal educational opportunities resulting from segregation. Id. at
493-95. Therefore, the court's statement that "[education] is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms" can reasonably be interpreted as dicta,
not binding on future courts. See id. at 493.
48. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
49. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the Court reviewed whether the Texas
public school funding system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the disparities in funding between rich and poor
school districts. Id. at 16-18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 18. The U.S. Supreme Court, recognizing the far-reaching effects
its decision would have had if the Court had held that strict scrutiny of the
education legislation was appropriate, noted the following:
If, as previous decisions have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the
State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the
State rather than the complainants must carry a "heavy burden of justification," that the state must demonstrate that its educational system has been
structured with "precision," and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate
objectives and that it has selected the "less drastic means" for effectuating
its objectives, the Texas financing system and its counterpartin virtually
every other State will not pass muster.
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
52. Id. at 30. Although the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
education, it noted that "the importance of a service performed by the State
does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of
examination under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. The Court further stated
that to hold a service fundamental for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause
because of the importance of the service would "be assuming a legislative role
and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence." Id. at 31.
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pate in the political process. 53 However, the Court failed to decide
whether the U.S. Constitution explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
the right to an education. 54 Furthermore, since the funding system
55
did not discriminate against any definable category of poor people,
nor did it absolutely deprive one of an education,5 6 the Court held
57
that the class was not suspect in traditional terms.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated that because education is
so interrelated to constitutionally guaranteed rights, education itFurthermore, Justice
self should be considered fundamental. 58
Marshall asserted that inequality written into the actual laws of the
state raises questions of equal protection, "not some notion of gross
inadequacy." 59 Nevertheless, the Rodriguez Court backed away
53. Id. at 37. The plaintiffs contended that the free exercise of explicit fundamental rights such as the right of free speech and the right to vote have a
sufficient interrelation to education to require recognition of a right to an education. Id. at 35-36. The Court stated that "we have never presumed to possess
either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id. at 36. Furthermore, the
Court stated that "no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process." Id. at 37.
54. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34. The Court stated that "[iut is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." Id. at 33. The Court further held
that fundamental rights are either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution, that education is not afforded explicit protection under the Constitution, and that it could not find any basis for implicit protection. Id. at 33-35.
55. Id. at 19-23. The Supreme Court discussed the problems with the "suspect class" of people who reside in poor districts by stating the following:
The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts
The Texas system of school fior delineation of the disfavored class ....
nancing might be regarded as discriminating (1) against "poor" persons
whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might
be characterized as functionally "indigent," or (2) against those who are
relatively poorer than others, or (3) against all those who, irrespective of
their personal income, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts.
Id. at 19-20.
56. Id. at 23-24. The Supreme Court further explained that the plaintiffs
did not evidence any discrimination because their lack of personal resources
had not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. Id. at 23.
Furthermore, the Court limited its holding by stating that "at least where
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 25.
58. Id. at 102. Justice Marshall advocates a "nexus" test, where a non-constitutional interest becomes more fundamental and demands a higher level of
judicial scrutiny when the nexus between the constitutionally guaranteed right
and the non-constitutional interest draws closer. Id. at 102-03. In this case, Justice Marshall believes that because of the close interrelation between education
and the exercise of a person's fundamental rights, particularly the right to free
speech and the right to vote, the Court should scrutinize legislation that provides for discrimination in education at a higher level. Id. at 110-17.
59. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 90. In Justice Marshall's view, "[t]he Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the un-
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from Brown's implication of education as a fundamental right,6 0
and chose not to view wealth as a suspect class. 61 Rather, the Court
shifted the burden of safeguarding education to the courts of the
individual states.6 2 The next section examines the methods of constitutional attack in state courts.
B. Methods of Attack in State Courts
Over the past twenty years, reformers have developed two
methods of attacking public school funding systems under a state
constitution. The first method relies on the equal protection and
due process clauses within the state's constitution.6 3 The second
method relies on an interpretation of the state's constitutional article mandating education.6 4 Each of these methods will be discussed
below.
1.

State Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses

Success in the state courts came prior to the Supreme Court's
holding in Rodriguez. In Serrano v. Priest(Serrano i),65 the Calijustifiable inequalities of state action." Id. at 89. Justice Marshall further
contended that the plaintiffs made a sufficient showing of disparities to raise a
substantial question of discriminatory state action. Id. at 90.
60. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial
review of legislative enactments under the Due Process Clause.
61. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial
review of legislative enactments under the Due Process Clause.
62. The majority in Rodriguez noted that protection of every important interest as a fundamental right would assume a legislative role. 411 U.S. at 31.
Consequently, the Court shifted the burden onto Congress, the state legislatures, or the state courts. The Court held that fundamental rights, for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, are only those either explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 33-34. However, the Illinois Constitution explicitly mandates education, allowing Illinois courts to hold
education as a fundamental right guaranteed under the Illinois Constitution by
paralleling federal equal protection analysis. See ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
63. State equal protection clauses are generally similar to the Equal Protection Clause within the U.S. Constitution:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Compare that with the Illinois Constitution, which states: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied
the equal protection of the laws." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
64. The Illinois Constitution mandates that "[t]he State shall provide for an
efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services."
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl. 2.
65. 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). In Serrano I, Los Angeles County public school
children and their parents brought a class action on behalf of all school children
in California except for those children for whom the public school system provides the best educational opportunities. Id. at 1244. The plaintiffs contended
that the public school system, which relies heavily upon local property taxes,
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fornia Supreme Court recognized that education plays two significant roles in society.6 First, education determines an individual's
chances for economic and social success in our society.6 7 Second,
education develops a child into a useful citizen by affecting his participation in political and social life.68 In view of this, the Serrano I
court held that education played such a "distinctive and priceless
function" in our society that it warrants treatment as a fundamental interest.6 9 Relying primarily on federal case law, 70 the Serrano I
court reviewed the California public school finance system under
strict scrutiny 71 for compliance with the U.S. Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause and subsequently held the system
72
unconstitutional.
After the U.S. Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, 73 the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II) 7 4 reviewed
its decision concerning the constitutional significance of unequal
created substantial disparities in funding, and resulted in substantial disparities
in educational opportunities throughout the state, thereby violating the equal
protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution. Id.
66. Id. at 1255-56.
67. Id.; see also supra notes 22-27 for other sources discussing the importance of education to the socioeconomic success of a child.
68. Id. at 1256; see supra notes 16-18 for sources recognizing that a democratic society requires its citizens to obtain a certain minimal education to participate in the political process.
69. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258.
70. Id. at 1256-58.
71. Id. at 1259-60. Under strict scrutiny, the California school finance system must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Id. The court
recognized two goals furthered by the structure: first, granting the local districts effective decision-making power over the administration of the schools;
and second, establishing local control over the amount of money spent on education. Id. at 1260. The court did not consider whether these interests were
compelling, because it found that "the present financial system cannot be considered necessary to further this interest." Id. The court further explained that
"[n]o matter how the state decides to finance its system of public education, it
can still leave this decision-making power in the hands of local districts." Id.
72. Id. at 1259-60. In Serrano I, the court emphasized that this was not a
final decision on the merits, and held that the complaint was legally sufficient
to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1266. However, the court deemed it
appropriate to make these non-binding findings to allow the trial court to
"properly provide for the enforcement of the judgment in such a way as to permit an orderly transition from an unconstitutional to a constitutional system of
school financing." Id.
73. In 1971, the California Supreme Court held that education is a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution. SerranoI, 487 P.2d 1241. However, in
1973, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the opposite way in Rodriguez on the same
issue. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. See supra notes 46-62 for an explanation of the
Rodriguez holding and rationale.
74. 557 P.2d 929 (1976). The California Supreme Court noted that "it is
clear that Rodriguez undercuts our decision in SerranoI to the extent that we
held the California public school financing system (if proved to be as alleged) to
be invalid as in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. at 949.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 26:399

funding. In SerranoII, the California Supreme Court, emphasizing
the importance placed on education by Serrano 1,7 5 held independently under California's state constitution 76 that "(1) discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of district wealth
involves a suspect classification, and (2) education is a fundamental
77
interest."
The Serrano II court noted that although the California state
provision for equal protection provides substantially the same guarantees as the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
state provisions are independent and may demand a different analysis. 7 8 The court further reasoned that a state may provide more
protection to individual rights than does the U.S. Supreme Court.79
Thus, the equal protection and due process clauses of state constitutions provide the first method of attack on state public school funding systems.
2.

The Education Article

The education articles within a state's constitution provide the
second method of attack. This method first appeared in Robinson v.
Cahill.80 Here the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the public
school finance system, which did not provide equal educational op75. Id at 951.
76. Id. at 951. In support of its decision, the court stated the following:

[I]n the area of fundamental civil liberties which includes... all protections
of the California Declaration of Rights, we sit as a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification that our interpretations may not restrict the
guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter. In
such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is California law and the
full panoply of rights Californians have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful
consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they
provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.
Id. at 950 (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that, under the state
constitution, a state can afford more protection to individual rights than the
United States Constitution affords. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041
(1983). However, the state must make clear that the protection is upon an adequate and independent state basis. Id.
77. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951.
78. Id. at 950. The court stated that the California equal protection clause is
"possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand an
analysis different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard
were applicable." Id.
79. See id.
80. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). In Robinson, the court addressed the issue of
whether the system of financing public schools which results in disparities in
the number of dollars spent per pupil, depending upon the district of residence,
violated the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 276.
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portunity, violated the "thorough and efficient" clause 8 ' of the
state's constitution.8 2 The New Jersey constitution mandates that
"the legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools."8 3 The court
determined that the ultimate responsibility of providing a "thorough and efficient" education rests with the state.8 4 The Robinson
court found that the "thorough and efficient" clause intended to
mandate equal educational opportunity for all children.8 5 The
court held that on the basis of discrepancies in funds per pupil, the
present funding system failed to meet the constitutional mandate
86
for a "thorough and efficient" system.
Presently, citizens in twenty-one states have challenged the
constitutionality of their public school funding systems utilizing one
of these two methods of attack.8 7 In eight states, plaintiffs have
been successful on equal protection arguments,8 8 in three states,
81. The New Jersey Education Article reads as follows: "The legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this state
between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
82. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 294-95.
83. N.J. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 4.

84. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 291. The court held that the New Jersey Constitution placed the responsibility directly upon the State, and the delegation of
taxing ability to local municipalities did not relieve the State of this duty. Id.
85. Id. at 294. In commenting on the "thorough and efficient" clause, the
court stated that "an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely
in mind." Id. "The mandate that there be maintained and supported 'a thorough and efficient system . . .' can have no other import." Id.
86. Id. at 295.
87. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc); Dupree v.
Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.
1971) (en banc); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982)
(en banc); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas,
285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975);
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v. Green, 212
N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684
(Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439
N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982) appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Britt v. North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Board of Educ.
v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v.
State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch.
Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va.
1979) (en banc); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
88. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973). There, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that the state constitution establishes education as a fundamental right. However, the school financing system, which meets the constitutional mandate of uniform, free, available, and open at least six months out of
the year, need otherwise only be rational, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
Id. See also Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983) (statutory
public school funding system is unconstitutional in that it denies equal protec-
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plaintiffs have been successful in reliance upon education articles,8 9
and in ten states, plaintiffs have been unsuccessful. 90 The present
tion and equal educational opportunities to property poor school districts in absence of rational relationship); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971)
(education is a fundamental interest which may not be conditioned on wealth);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976) (education is a fundamental right,
and system of financing public education cannot pass the test of strict judicial
scrutiny); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989) (the
Montana Constitution guarantees equal educational opportunity); Seattle Sch.
Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (children residing within the state have a
constitutional right to an education for which the state must provide sufficient
funds for a general and uniform system of public schools); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979) (mandate that state establish a thorough and efficient
system of schools makes education a fundamental, constitutional right, and any
discrimination in financing cannot stand unless the state demonstrates a compelling state interest); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo. 1979) (education is a matter of fundamental interest and statutory classification based upon wealth is suspect, whereby the state must show the statutory system meets a compelling government interest, with means least
onerous), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
89. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (in
order to comply with the constitutional mandate of efficient system of common
schools, the system must be substantially uniform and provide equal opportunities to every child for an adequate education); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273
(N.J. 1973) (the constitutional mandate of a thorough and efficient system of
free public schools requires equal educational opportunity to all children
throughout the state), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (the framers of the constitution would
have neither envisioned nor condoned the present system with its gross disparities, and therefore, the constitutional mandate of thorough and efficient system
of schools requires the system to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge
across the entire state).
90. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en
banc) (selecting school system which provides for equal educational opportunities throughout the state depends upon considerations and goals which properly
lie within the legislative domain); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981) (the adequate education provisions within the constitution do not require
the state to equalize educational opportunities between districts); Thompson v.
Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975) (school financing system which results in
differences in per-pupil expenditures does not violate the constitutional requirement of uniform system of public schools); Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (neither specific constitutional mandate to
provide for, nor mandate to establish thorough and efficient schools, elevates
education to a fundamental right requiring equality in per-pupil funding); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711, 719 (Mich. 1973) ("[I]t has not been shown that
eliminating disparities in expenditures will significantly improve the quality or
quantity of educational services or opportunity offered to Michigan school children."); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983) (objectives of expenditures of public money for educational purposes present issues of enormous practical and political complexity, and therefore, reside appropriately in the arena
of legislative and executive authority); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of
Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (although the constitutional
mandate that "equal opportunities shall be provided for all students" emphasizes that the days of racial segregation are over, it does not contemplate absolute equal educational opportunity throughout the state), cert. denied, 361
S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979) (the
statutory system of school finance does not violate the constitutional provision
to secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools), cert. denied, 444
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lawsuit in Illinois challenges the public school funding system using
both methods of attack. 91
III.

THE CHALLENGE IN ILLINOIS

The suit in Illinois challenges the public school funding system
on the grounds that it violates the Illinois education article, the Illinois equal protection clause, the Illinois due process clause, and the
no-special-law article.92 The complaint alleges that unequal expenditures among school districts violate the education article because such disparities prevent "an efficient system of high quality"
education. 9 3 The complaint further alleges that the expenditures
94
violate the equal protection clause and the no-special-law article
because the distribution scheme is irrational and/or because the distribution scheme imposes unnecessary burdens upon the constitutionally suspect class of children living in school districts with
relatively lower property wealth.9 5 Finally, the complaint alleges
that the current funding system violates the Illinois due process
clause because the resulting unequal funding impinges upon the
96
fundamental right of education.
A.

fIlinois' "Thorough and Efficient" Clause

Initially, the complaint alleges that unequal funding fails to
provide an efficient system of high quality education, and therefore
U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976) (the present system of
school financing rationally furthers the legitimate state interest of local control); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979) (there is no requirement under
the Pennsylvania Constitution that educational opportunities be uniform
throughout the state).
91. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 53-57.
92. Id. at 54.
93. Id. at 54-55; see also supra note 64 for the text of the Illinois education
article.
94. Judicial review of legislative enactments under the no-special-law article generally parallels that of the equal protection clause noted here by the
Illinois Supreme Court:
Special legislation differs from a violation of equal protection in that the
latter consists of arbitrary and invidious discrimination againsta person or
class of persons. It results from the governmental withholding of a right,
privilege or benefit from a person or class of persons without a reasonable
basis (or, where a fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, a
compelling State interest) for doing so. Whether a law is attacked as special legislation or as violative of equal protection, it is still the duty of the
courts to decide whether the classification is unreasonable in that it preferentially and arbitrarily includes a class (special legislation) to the exclusion
of all others, or improperly denies a benefit to a class (equal protection).
Polygraph Society v. Pellicano, 83 Ill. 2d 130, 138, 414 N.E.2d 458, 462-63 (Ill.
1980) (citations omitted).
95. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 53-54.
96. Id.
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violates the thorough and efficient clause of the education article. 97
The plaintiffs' allegation assumes that the constitutional terminology "efficient" mandates either equal funding or equal educational
opportunities. The validity of this assumption requires review of
the case law defining the word "efficient" and examination of the
constitutional debates concerning equal educational opportunities.
The following sections undertake this review.

1.

The Definition of "Thorough and Efficient"

When the delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention
asked the Education Committee whether the term "efficient"
98
would carry the same meaning it had under the 1870 constitution,
99
the Committee answered that it would.
The Illinois Supreme
Court has held that "thorough and efficient" imposes two requirements upon the legislature when implementing the concept: the
school system must be free and must be open to all without discrimination.1 00 Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of "efficient" under the 1870 constitution, which the delegates adopted
into the 1970 constitution, does not support the assumption that an
"efficient" system requires one that equally funds all students.

2. The ConstitutionalDebate Over Equalized Funding
During the Constitutional Convention of 1970, the delegates debated considerably over the issue of equalized funding. 10 1 During
the first of three readings of the proposed education article, the
97. Id. at 54-55.
98. 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 766 (1970) [hereinafter RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS]. For an objective and
interesting commentary on the constitutional debates surrounding the education article adopted into the 1970 Illinois Constitution, see JANE G. BURESH, A
FUNDAMENTAL GOAL: EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS 82-122 (1975).
99. 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 766.
100. People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 30, 81 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1948). In
Deatherage,the State's Attorney of Morgan County, through the thorough and
efficient clause, challenged the validity of the school code which allowed frac-

tioning of a prior school district. Id. at 29-30, 81 N.E.2d at 585. The State's
Attorney alleged that the fractioning would "make it impossible for the district
to maintain a school at the prior level of efficiency and thoroughness." Id. at 30,
81 N.E.2d at 585. The Deatheragecourt affirmed the judgment and sustained
the school code, holding that the thorough and efficient clause places only two
limitations upon the legislature: the schools must be free, and must be open to
all without discrimination. Id. at 30, 81 N.E.2d at 586. See also People v. Barrington Consol. High Sch. Dist., 396 Ill. 129, 71 N.E.2d 86 (1947); Fiedler v.
Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11, 166 N.E. 504 (1929); People ex rel. Leighty v. Young, 301 Ill.
67, 133 N.E. 693 (1921).
101. 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 3535-70. The proposals
mandate the state to directly provide at least 90% of the funds for operational
costs of public schools. Id. See also BURESH, supra note 98, at 95 (noting that
the "[d]iscussion on the topic of financing public schools was lengthy; it occupied three hundred thirty-two pages of the transcript of August 4.").
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younger members of the Education Committee submitted a proposal to mandate that the state provide at least ninety percent of the
funds for operational costs.' 0 2 This proposal was intended to accomplish two goals. First, it attempted to reduce the burden of real
03
and personal property taxes on the farmer and the homeowner.
Second, it attempted to equalize educational opportunities throughi 4
out the state.1
A minority of members on the Education Committee presented
five objections to the proposal: (1) the committee had not sufficiently investigated the effects of this provision, and "freezing" such
a mandate into the constitution would be ill-advised; (2) the legislature had been annually increasing state appropriations thereby potentially creating total state financing; (3) the legislature would
need to greatly increase income or sales taxes to produce the funds;
(4) local school boards and parents would lose local control; and (5)
the provision might reduce all school districts to a level of mediocrity. 0 5 After considering proposed amendments requiring the state
to provide fifty percent of operational costs, 0 6 the committee dele07
gates rejected the proposal on the first reading.'
On the second reading, Delegate Netsch proposed the following
amendment: "The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of educational institutions and services.' 0 8 In explaining her amendment, Netsch admitted that the language did
not provide a legally enforceable duty, but "hope[d] that it [would]
function as a conscience to the General Assembly to assume a
greater proportion of the financing of public schools of the state."' 0 9
A second alternative amendment specifically mandated that the
state "provide for a substantial parity of educational opportunity
throughout the state." 10 The delegates rejected the latter amend102. 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 3536-44.
103. Id. This is the author's summary of separate arguments advocated individually by Delegates Fogal, Patch, Howard, Dove, Kamin, and Pughsley. See

id.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 3544-51. This is the author's summary of separate arguments advocated individually by Delegates Mathias, Evans, Bottino, Buford, and Parker.
See id.
106. Id. at 3550-51. Delegate Bottino proposed an amendment mandating the
state to provide 50% of operational costs. Id.
107. 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 3567-70. The vote was
conducted by a roll call with many delegates explaining the reasons for their
position. Id.
108.

5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 4145.

109. Id. at 4145.
110. Id. at 4145-46. Delegate Bottino proposed this alternate amendment and
stated that his language was not hortatory, unlike Delegate Netsch's proposal.

Id.
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ment;"' however, they approved Netsch's amendment on the third
and final reading upon reassurance that the statement did not pro112
vide a legally enforceable duty on the state.
The 1970 Illinois Constitution contains words giving the state
"the primary responsibility for financing the system of educational
institutions and services." 113 However, the constitutional debates
specifically contravene the assertion that the delegates intended
this provision to explicitly require the General Assembly to provide
for an equalized funding system. In summary, neither the case law
explaining the meaning of the word "efficient," nor the debates
during the 1970 Constitutional Convention supports the contention
that the word "efficient" mandates equal educational opportunity,
or a system that provides substantially the same expenditures per
student. Consequently, an approach to declare the finance system
unconstitutional simply on the basis of the education article and its
"thorough and efficient" clause should fail in Illinois.
B.

Children in Poor School Districtsas a Suspect Class

The complaint in the Illinois lawsuit alleges that the funding
system violates the Illinois equal protection clause by imposing un114
of
necessary burdens upon the "constitutionally suspect" class
children living in school districts with relatively lower property
wealth." 5 Alleging a class based upon wealth poses a problem because the phrase "people living in property poor districts" specifies
too broad of a class with neither a definite description of the classifying facts, nor a delineation of the disfavored class. 116 In Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "people living in poor
districts" may define one of three categories of people: (1) persons
whose income falls below the legally recognized poverty level; (2)
persons who are simply poorer than others; or (3) persons who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in school dis11 7
tricts with relatively lower property values.
The complaint alleges facts to support all three of these categories outlined in Rodriguez. Consistent with the first category, the
complaint alleges discrimination toward students from poverty111. Id. at 4148-49.
112. Id. at 4500-07.
113. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl. 3.
114. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text discussing due process
analysis in Illinois.
115. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 53.
116. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text for the development of
this analysis in the Rodriguez opinion.
117. 411 U.S. at 19-20; see also supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text for
an explanation of the Rodriguez opinion.
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stricken families.11 Further, the complaint alleges discrimination
by comparing the differences between funding of the richest ten
percent of school districts and the poorest ten percent of school districts. 119 Finally, consistent with the third category, the complaint
alleges large differences in funding between two adjacent school
districts, Byron and Mt. Morris, in which neither the wealth of the
school children's parents, nor the level of private property values is
120
a factor.
If an Illinois court were to recognize a suspect class, it would
have to choose one of these classes. However, choosing only one of
these classes defines only part of the problem and ignores the
broader scope of equalizing educational opportunities for all students regardless of which of these categories fits their situation.
This would encourage reform legislation targeted only to solve the
problem selected. On the other hand, inclusion of all these categories creates an unduly large suspect class suggesting equal funding
of all state-funded civil services in general. Neither choice is acceptable if the court's focus is education and its intent is to insure
equal educational opportunities throughout the state. Thus, any approach based on a suspect class in violation of the Illinois equal protection clause should be rejected.
C. Enforcing Fiscal Neutrality Through the Illinois Due Process
Clause
The final method of attack taken by the complaint alleges that
education is a fundamental right in Illinois, and that the present
disparate funding system denies the plaintiffs their substantive due
118. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 53. The complaint sets forth particular problems children are faced with in poverty stricken
environments. Id. at 44. Furthermore, the complaint illustrates the various
social problems that inhibit a minimal education, such as the disintegration of
the social and family structure, dangers of crime, and the absence of positive
role models leading directly to educational disadvantages. Id. at 45. In addition,
the complaint contends that proper funding for programs designed to help children at younger ages, such as the "at risk" program, do make a difference and
produce socio-emotional development in 80% of the children participating in
the program. Id. at 49. Finally, the complaint notes that studies have shown
that the positive growth children experience through the program dissipates if
they are not continually provided with a decent educational environment. Id.
119. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 27-45. The
complaint notes the differences in relative property values in the richest and
poorest 10% of school districts, the relationship to per pupil spending disparities, and the differences in educational services resulting from such disparities.

Id.
120. Id. at 38-43. In 1990 and 1991, the Byron district enjoyed substantially
more funds per student, $10,085 contrasted to the Mt. Morris school district at
$3,483. Id. This disparity is due to a nuclear plant Commonwealth Edison built
within the Byron school district in the mid 1970s. Id. See supra note 7 for a list
of the contrasting educational services offered as a result of the differences in
funding.
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process rights. 121 This section will conclude that the fundamental
right of education is implicit in the Illinois Constitution, and that
the present system will not withstand scrutiny under the Illinois
due process clause. Further, recognition of education as a fundamental right attacks the problem in its necessary scope without involving an unduly large suspect class.
1.

Recognizing Education as a FundamentalRight

Illinois courts have never resolved the issue of whether education is a fundamental right.122 However, there are a number of
ways in which courts have recognized the existence of fundamental
123
rights not explicitly mentioned by the terms of the constitution.
When a constitution specifically mentions or guarantees a right,
courts generally recognize that right as fundamental, and then de124 Comtermine if the interest affected is the right guaranteed.
121. Id. at 54-55.
122. Although the court in People ex rel. Jones v. Adams addressed this specific issue, the court need not have addressed it. 40 Ill. App. 2d 189, 350 N.E.2d
767 (5th Dist. 1976). In Adams, Illinois farmers argued that the method of public school financing deprived children in poorer districts equal protection of the
laws. Id. at 191, 350 N.E.2d at 769. The Adams court adopted a Rodriguez "invidious" standard for review, but found that the defendants (1) failed to introduce any evidence concerning the discriminatory aspects of the Illinois method
of financing, (2) failed to provide any analysis of the statistics they did provide,
(3) failed to introduce any evidence concerning the inadequacy of the education
provided to poor school districts, and (4) failed to provide any evidence concerning the disparity of expenditures between rich and poor districts. Id. at 200, 350
N.E.2d at 776. Because of this lack of proof, the court found that the Illinois
method of financing did not deny the students equal protection of the laws. Id.
at 201, 350 N.E.2d at 776.
While not finding for the defendants in this case, the court suggested that
the Illinois method of school funding did violate equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 200, 350 N.E.2d at 776. However, subsequent litigation probably never
occurred because the Adams court was reviewing the method of school funding
before the 1973 reformation of school finance by the Illinois Legislature. Id.
123. The two major tests for determining if an interest is fundamental under
the U.S. Constitution have been whether the interest is "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" or whether the interest is fundamental in light of the "traditions and collective conscious of our people." See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (recognizing that the right of married
couples to use voluntary birth control ranks as fundamental when looking to
the traditions and collective conscience of our people); see also id. at 500
(Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the restriction of voluntary birth control
from married couples "violates the basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
124. For example, the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech
which also encompasses symbolism as a protected form of expression. See
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (display of a modified American flag
is a protected form of expression).
Recently, the people of Illinois voted on revising the education article to
unambiguously indicate that (1) education is a fundamental right, (2) the state
must guarantee equality of educational opportunity, and (3) the state would
have the preponderant financial responsibility for the public school system.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF ILLINOIS (submitted to the
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mentators have concluded that the Illinois Constitution implicitly
guarantees the right to an equal education. This implicit guarantee
comes from the stated goal to "educate all persons to the limits of
their capacities"'125 coupled with the mandate to provide "an efficient system of high quality public education."' 126 Additionally,
since education is the only government entitlement guaranteed by
the state constitution, Illinois should recognize the right to education as fundamental. 127 Recognition of education as a fundamental
voters on November 3, 1992) (George H. Ryan, Secretary of State). The proposed amendments required approval of either 50% of the registered voters, or
60% of the people who actually voted on the amendment. ILL. CONST. art. XIV
§ 2(b). The proposed amendment failed ratification, but nevertheless, it attained the approval of 58% of the people of Illinois who voted on the amendment.
The amendment's ratification failure does not adversely effect the current
constitutional challenge for two reasons: first, the courts must interpret the
current constitutional language without regard to language that failed to pass;
second, the amendment's failure in no way indicates that the people of Illinois
would have adopted contrary language indicating that education is not a fundamental right - quite the contrary, such a proposition would have at best only
received 42% of the vote.
However, the proposed amendment's failure may subtlely provide an argument for recognizing education as a fundamental right. All constitutional decisions are slightly motivated for political reasons, in that a court is ill-advised to
establish a constitutional rule that is unacceptable to the public. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Supreme Court as Constitutional Interpreter: Chronology
without History, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1384, 1388 (1992) (stating that "the Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretation has always been greatly affected by contemporary political, social, and economic developments."). However, the proposed amendment's 58% approval rating by the people who voted on the
amendment indicate that a majority of Illinois citizens are ready for such a constitutional decision.
125. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl. 1.
126. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl. 2; see Michael P. Seng & Michael Booden,
JudicialEnforcement of the Right to an Equal Education in Illinois, 12 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 45, 76 (1991). This article stresses the change of focus from the 1870
Constitution, having the General Assembly establish a public school system, to
a new focus in the 1970 Constitution, the needs of the individual students regardless of handicap, ability, or wealth. Id. This article concludes the following:
There can be no doubt that Article X, section 1 guarantees the right to an
equal education in Illinois. This right is derived from the State's stated goal
to educate all persons to the limits of their capacities and the State's duty to
establish 'an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions
and services.'
Id.
Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the state's vital interest in education by noting the following: "That education is a compelling
state interest is not disputed here. Article X, section 1, of the constitution of
Illinois states, 'A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.'" Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 142 Ill. 2d 54, 90, 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1299 (Ill. 1990).
127. The complaint filed in Illinois takes the approach that education is the
only government entitlement or service that is guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, thereby elevating education to the status of a fundamental right. See
Defendant's Memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss at 15-16, Committee for Educ. Rights v. Jim Edgar, No. 90 Ch. 11097 (Cook County Cir. Ct.
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right in Illinois would then invoke a higher level of scrutiny by the
courts under a substantive due process analysis.
In addition to arguing that education is not a fundamental
right, the defendants in the Illinois suit, relying on People ex rel.
Ogilvie v. Lewis,128 contend that the specific constitutional provision of the education article controls over the general constitutional
provision of the due process clause. 129 Thus, the defendants argue
that the equal protection clause may not be used to overturn the
1970 Constitutional Convention's refusal to mandate fiscal neutrality in the education article. 130 However, the defendants' logic is
incorrect.
First, the delegates did not mandate the absence of fiscal neutrality in the education article. 131 Furthermore, simply because one
provision of the constitution does not require an outcome does not
thereby imply that such a result cannot be required by another provision. 32 Therefore, the present funding system violates the due
process clause regardless of whether it directly violates the education article.
filed Nov. 13, 1990), appeal docketed, No. 92-2379 (1st Dist. July 20, 1992) (order
granting defendant's motion to dismiss). Alternatively, education is elevated to
a fundamental interest because of the interrelationship with the fundamental
right of free speech. See id. More specifically, see Plaintiff's First Complaint at
55, Committee for Educ. Rights v. Jim Edgar, No. 90 Ch. 11097 (Cook County
Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 1990) (order granting defendant's motion to dismiss), appeal docketed, No. 92-2379 (1st Dist. July 20, 1992).
Compare Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973). In Shofstall, the
court held that although the state constitution establishes education as a fundamental right, the school financing system, which meets the constitutional mandate of being uniform, free, available, and open at least six months out of the
year need otherwise only be rational, reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Id. at
592. The court recognized that education plays a vital role in the political process and in the exercise of related fundamental rights; however, the court rejects the notion that the constitutional mandate with those goals in mind also
mandates equal educational opportunity. Id.
This conclusion gives no effect to the equal protection clause of the state. If
a court recognizes an express or implied fundamental right, an operable equal
protection clause should guarantee equal opportunity to exercise and take full
advantage of that right.
128. 49 Ill. 2d 476, 274 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. 1971).
129. Id. at 488, 274 N.E.2d at 95. See Defendant's Memorandum in support of
their Motion to Dismiss at 15, Committee for Educ. Rights v. Jim Edgar, No. 90
Ch. 11097 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 1990), appeal docketed, No. 922379 (1st Dist. July 20, 1992).
130. People ex rel. Ogilvie, 49 Ill. 2d at 488, 274 N.E.2d at 95.
131. On the contrary, as the plaintiffs point out, there was almost unanimous
support for the principle of fiscal neutrality. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 17-22, Committee for Educ. Rights v. Jim Edgar,
No. 90 Ch. 11097 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 1990), appeal docketed, No.
92-2379 (1st Dist. July 20, 1992) (Delegate Foster was the sole holdout disfavoring equality in the distribution of financial resources).
132. If this contention were not true, a party would be forbidden to bring
alternative constitutional grounds, which is clearly not the case.
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In summary, Illinois courts should recognize education as a
fundamental right for two reasons. First, the Illinois Constitution
specifically guarantees the people of Illinois a public education.
Second, the right is implied from the wording of the education article. Recognizing public education as a fundamental right would invoke a higher level of scrutiny from the courts under substantive
due process analysis, as discussed below.
2. Application of the Substantive Due Process Analysis
In a statutory challenge on the grounds of substantive due process, Illinois courts employ a two-step analysis. 133 The court first
determines the proper level of scrutiny to apply and then determines whether the legislative enactment withstands that level of
scrutiny. 34 If the statute affects a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class, the court will subject the legislation to
strict scrutiny. As a result, the court will uphold the statute only if
it serves a compelling state interest. 3 5 If the legislation does not
affect a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class,
the court will uphold the legislation if it bears a rational relation136
ship to a legitimate legislative purpose.
If Illinois courts recognize education as a fundamental right,
the reasons for the state's reliance on local property taxes in funding local school districts must serve a compelling governmental interest. 137 There are two main purposes for preserving reliance on
local property taxes: (1) funding from local property taxes does not
fluctuate with the economy as do income and sales taxes; and (2)
local officials can more quickly respond to the needs of parents and
children within a district than can state officials. 138 Proceeding on
a case by case basis, courts have recognized a number of interests as
compelling; however, they have failed to develop a constitutional
test. Generally, courts have recognized a number of interests as
compelling, however, usually proceeding on a case-by-case basis,
133. Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 367-68, 489 N.E.2d
1374, 1382 (Ill. 1986). In Harris,the defendants alleged that an award of treble
damages where negligence is the basis of liability violates due process. Id. at
366-67, 489 N.E.2d at 1381-82.
134. Id. at 367-68, 489 N.E.2d at 1382.
135. Id. at 368, 489 N.E.2d at 1382.
136. Id. The court explained that, under the rational-basis test, "[a]s long as
there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be
upheld." Id.
137. See id. at 368-69, 489 N.E.2d at 1382 (holding that the government must
serve a compelling interest when affecting a fundamental right).
138. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 838-39. See also note 105 and accompanying
text discussing the policies behind funding school districts with local property
taxes voiced at the Illinois 1970 Constitutional Convention.
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never developing a constitutional test. 139 Although the courts give
little guidance, the interests recognized usually involve a public
140
health or safety issue, or a countervailing constitutional interest.
Concerning the first purpose of relying on local property taxes,
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shapiro v. Thompson 141 provides guidance. There the Court held that administrative
convenience would not suffice as a compelling state interest. 142 Relying on more predictable property taxes facilitates budget planning, thereby promoting an administrative function of the school
system. Persuaded by the direction of the United States Supreme
Court in Shapiro, an Illinois court should not consider the administrative convenience of budget planning a compelling state interest.
Regarding the second purpose of relying on local property
taxes, communities will not lose the responsiveness of local officials
139. For example, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the
United States Supreme Court held that an admission policy of a medical school
that discriminated on the basis of race was unconstitutional. 438 U.S. 265, 320
(1978). In its analysis, the Court held that any classification based upon race is
constitutionally suspect, giving rise to strict scrutiny. Id. at 291. In invalidating
the admission policy, the Court held that the purpose of helping certain groups
whom the facility perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" did not stand
as a compelling interest, and therefore did not justify the discrimination. Id. at
310. The Court did hold that the interest in "ethnic diversity" was compelling
in the context of the university's admission standards, however, stated that the
program's racial classification was not essential to advance this interest. Id. at
314-15.
140. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(holding that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding that drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees
without probable cause, due to the dangerous nature to the public, is a compelling government interest); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (stating that fundamental fairness in the jury
selection process is a compelling interest); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (finding that protecting a victimized child
is a compelling interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the
state has a compelling interest in the life of a viable fetus); Fumarolo v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., 142 Ill. 2d 54, 566 N.E.2d 1283 (1990) (stating that education is a
compelling state interest); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880
(1985) (finding that the reduction of drunk driving and alcohol related deaths is
a compelling state interest); People v. Gacy, 103 Ill. 2d 1, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (1984)
(holding that deterring crime is a compelling government interest); People v.
Village of Long Grove, 169 Ill. App. 3d 866, 523 N.E.2d 656 (2d Dist. 1988) (finding a compelling public interest in deterring municipalities from depriving landowners of notice of annexing proceedings); People v. Morgan, 152 Ill. App. 3d
97, 504 N.E.2d 172 (1st Dist. 1987) (concluding that the physical and mental
well-being of a child testifying in a rape case is a compelling interest).
141. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
142. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. The state advanced four administrative purposes for a residency requirement that affected a fundamental right to freely
travel interstate. Id. at 633-34. These administrative purposes consisted of the
following: (1) facilitating the planning of the welfare budget, (2) providing an
objective test of residency, (3) minimizing the possibility of fraud, and (4) encouraging early resident admission. Id. at 634.
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except on the issue of funding. If local control of funding is the
main purpose in relying on local property taxes, this purpose is invalid because it contradicts the constitutional goal of educating all
children to the limits of their capacities. This purpose rests on a
parent's desire to convert a public school system into a private
school system focused on the interest of his child, instead of the
interests of all children in the state. Therefore, any purpose relating to local responsiveness or administrative convenience should be
rejected as not being a compelling governmental interest, and the
present method of public school funding should be held unconstitutional for unduly infringing upon a constitutional right, thus violat143
ing the Illinois due process clause.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF FUNDING

If the Illinois judicial branch takes an affirmative role in education reform by declaring the present system unconstitutional, the
General Assembly will need to define the specific provisions to implement a new funding system. However, the judicial branch must
fashion a constitutional remedy by outlining the structure of a new
funding system that meets the constitutional requirements. This
section will overview the present method of funding in Illinois, explain alternative methods of funding possibly suited for Illinois, and
discuss experiences in other states using these methods.
A.

The Present Method of Public School Funding In Illinois

Illinois' present system initially funds local school districts
with local property taxes, then the state provides additional funding
in accordance with one of two alternate plans.14 4 The state's present funding system combines a foundation plan ("FP") 145 with a resource

equalization

plan

("REP"). 1 46

The

Illinois

General

143. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating that "[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law .... ).
144. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8(5) (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para.
18-8(5) (Supp. 1991)).

145. See id. (outlining the state's funding system in the form of a foundation
plan); see also COONS ET AL., supra note 20, at 64 (describing a "foundation plan"
funding system). A foundation program establishes a minimum dollar level
which is required to provide a student an adequate education. Id. The state
guarantees this minimum funding level for each student provided that the local
district complies with a minimum property tax rate. Id. To preserve incentive,
the local district can raise property taxes in an effort to raise additional local
revenues. Id. The advantage to an FP is that shifts in spending can take effect
almost immediately because of local control. Id. Additionally, it leaves parents
with apparent control over their children's education. Id.
146. See 105 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/18-8(5) (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para.
18-8(5) (1991)) (setting up the structure of the Illinois public school finance program); see also Schwartz, supra note 27, at 835 (characterizing the Illinois funding program as the "Strayer-Haig state aid formula" after its founders).
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Assembly enacted the present program in 1974, replacing a pure
FP, presumptively in response to increased litigation in state and
federal courts concerning unequal funding issues. 147 The REP provides for more equal expenditures than the old FP; however, it
equalizes less than a straightforward district power equalization
plan 148 because wealthier school districts may opt for the alterna149
tive FP.
The FP requires a minimum taxation on local property to qualify for state supplements. 150 The FP will supplant any amount to
provide for a basic amount of $520 per pupil; however, even when
supplemental funds are not required, every district is guaranteed at
least $48 per pupil.1 5 1

This guaranteed minimum prompts rich

school districts to opt for the FP when no funds are guaranteed
52
through the REP.'
Under the REP option, each district is guaranteed a certain
level of funds per student, corresponding to a tax rate that the local
residents choose. 153 If the local tax rate does not yield that guaranteed amount, for example if property values are low, then the state
provides the supplemental funds. 5 4 The amount guaranteed will
be equal to the selected tax rate multiplied by a standard property
value. 155 The funds guaranteed per student in K-12 district schools
are equal to the selected tax rate multiplied by $74,791.156 Similarly, the funds guaranteed per student in elementary districts and
high school districts are equal to the selected tax rate multiplied by
157
$108,644 and $187,657 respectively.
The REP limits operating tax rates to 2.76% for K-12 districts,
1.9% for elementary districts, and 1.1% for high school districts.' 58
However, through a "voter override," a school district can exceed
147. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 836-37 (noting that "[t]he public focus on
school finance reform led to the passage in 1973 of an alternative state aid
formula called the resource equalizer. Through this formula, the state sought
to equalize spending levels by ameliorating the effect of wealth or poverty in
school districts.").

148. W. Norton Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms in the PostSerrano World, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 459 app. at 477 (1974).
149. Id.
150.

105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18(5) (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 18-

8(5) (Supp. 1991)).
151. Id.
152. Grubb, supra note 148, app. at 477.
153. Id. at 478.
154. Id. at 478.
155. Id. at 478.
156. Id. at 478.
157. Grubb, supra note 148, at 478.
158. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18(5) (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 188(5) (1991)).
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the maximum under certain conditions. 15 9 This limit generally prevents both rich and poor districts from excessive taxing to provide
large funds for education. However, rich districts rarely opt for the
REP and are not subject to the limit.' 60 Although the REP option
school disnarrows the gap in funding between wealthy and poor
16 1
tricts, it has not provided for equalized expenditures.
B. Alternative Methods of Funding Promoting Equal
EducationalOpportunities
Three general methods of public school funding are specifically
designed to reduce or eliminate inequalities in educational opportunity. These methods are District Power Equalization, Full State
162
Funding, and Voucher Plans (also known as Family Choice).
This section will briefly discuss the structure of these methods, as
well as their advantages and disadvantages.
1.

District Power Equalization
163

The first method, District Power Equalization ("DPE"),
maintains the structural appearance of a wealth-based system making it the most politically acceptable of the three options. 64 In fact,
the REP option in Illinois resembles a DPE in many ways.' 65 A
DPE formula allows a school district to spend at any desired level
166
and adopt a school rate tax according to that spending level.
However, the spending level is not tied to the amount of revenues
collected, but only to the tax rate selected. 167 Therefore, rich
school districts collect more revenues than they are allowed to expend. 16 Under this method, the state would "recapture" the revenues in excess of the predetermined spending level and then
distribute the funds to poor school districts whose tax rates did not
raise sufficient revenues to meet their predetermined spending
159. See id. (describing the conditions which allow school districts to exceed
the maximum funding).
160. See id. (setting forth the state's REP funding system).
161. See supra notes 7-12 illustrating the disparities created under the pres-

ent public school funding system in Illinois.
162. See supra notes 146-61 and accompanying text discussing the methods
Illinois presently employs for funding public education.
163. See COONS ET AL., supra note 20, at 201-42 (describing the general workings of a DPE plan).
164. See Robert L. Manteuffel, The Quest for Efficiency: Public School
Funding in Texas, 43 Sw. L. J. 1119, 1129 (1990) (discussing briefly the four
basic funding alternatives including the DPE).

165. See supra notes 144-61 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
REP option that Illinois offers within its present funding system.
166. See COONS ET AL., supra note 20, at 201-42 (discussing a district "power
equalizing" system).

167. See id.
168. See id.
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levels. 169
The advantage of DPE is that it leaves local communities some
control over expenditures, while at the same time providing some
equalization among communities. 170 However, continued reliance
on local property taxes, even through a DPE, creates disparities in
expenditures 171 that can only be alleviated by placing the burden of
school finance completely on the state.
2. Full State Funding
The second method, Full State Funding ("FSF"), allocates all
funding to individual school districts based upon a per student
amount and places all responsibility for school funding at the state
level.172 Although local school districts and their constituents still
maintain control of operations, funding becomes a state issue in
which the quality of education for all children in all districts reflects the concerns of all the citizens. 173 Additionally, an FSF can
respond to particular needs of the children, whereas the per student
amount can be a function of regional cost difference, or costs associated with handicapped and disabled children. 174 This system creates equality between the districts and allocates money primarily
175
upon the characteristics of the child.
Despite some advantages, an FSF does have drawbacks. First,
reliance on state income and sales tax revenues, shifted away from
property tax revenues, requires restructuring of more than just the
169. See id.
170. See id.; see also Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1129 (describing the advantage of the DPE system).
171. For example, in New Jersey, the state legislature instituted a DPE.
Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1131-33. Although the DPE lessened the disparities between school districts, consequently the new funding system was constitutionally defeated because of the disparities of funding between wealthy and
poor school districts. Abbot v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). See also Stephan
Michelson, What is a "Just"System for FinancingSchools? An Evaluationof
Alternative Reforms, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 436 (1974) (discussing the
merits of various school finance systems). Michelson makes some strong comments in disapproval of a DPE:
DPE increases inequality, but it seems to reverse the slope.... District
power equalizing is in no way neutral, but requires the state to express a
philosophy on the value of children which is related to their district's tax
characteristics. It may or may not be equalizing in result, but in form it is
nothing more than price manipulation.
Id. at 448.
172. Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1129; see Michelson, supra note 171, at
457-58 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of FSF).
173. See Michelson, supra note 171, at 457-58 (describing the impact of FSF
upon the school districts).
174. Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1128.
175. Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1128; see also Michelson, supra note 171,
at 457-58 (outlining the operation of a FSF system).
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education funding system. 176 However, this problem may be overcome by "recapturing" a designated percentage of local property
taxes, similar to a DPE. Second, an FSF method may create equal
funding, but it does not inherently take into account "municipal
overburden" on urban communities, 177 or other special needs of the
handicapped or learning disabled. However, these concerns can be
factored into the financing equation as is done now with the REP.
Finally, a FSF may face strong political opposition because it gives
the local community the perception that they have virtually no con178
trol over the education of their children.
3.

Voucher Plans or Family Choice

The third method, a Voucher Plan or Family Choice ("FC")
Plan, gives parents a voucher to spend at the school of their
choice. 179 An FC allows the family to choose the kind of education
they believe is best for the child.' 8 0 A family can base this decision
on the teachers, science facilities, artistic opportunities, or even
181
sports programs available at the various schools.
An FC provides equal educational opportunity by ensuring
equal access to educational resources rather than providing equalized funding. 8 2 An FC not only gives more control to the family,
but proponents also argue that the market-like distribution of edu176. Compare Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1128 with Michelson, supra
note 171, at 452-53 (contrasting the author's views regarding the FSF system).
Michelson argues that although issues of expenditure and revenues are inherently related, it is more important to conceptualize and structure the system on
what would produce a good distribution of funds, apart from considerations of a
good tax structure and its associated problems. Michelson, supra note 171, at
452-53.
177. Michelson, supra note 171, at 452-53. Municipal overburden is the extra
costs to urban school districts associated with increased security or poverty. Id.
at 452. Michelson argues that municipal overburden is not a school finance issue, and thus these problems should be dealt with by either the state or the
community separately without complicating the public school revenue package.
Id. at 453.
178. Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1128.
179. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Family Choice: The Next Step in the Quest
for Equal Educational Opportunity, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513, 513-14
(1974) (analyzing various funding systems, including the Family Choice plan);
see also Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1130 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of a FC plan).
180. Sugarman, supra note 179, at 514.
181. See id. at 518 (contending that diversity of school experiences not only
affects the children in a positive way, but also promotes the mental health of
parents who feel powerless in the direction of their children's education).
182. See id. at 514, 520-21 (describing how a Family Choice plan may result in
a complete breakdown of the local school district system and the control exercised through such a system). Under Family Choice, the family's ability to control the education of their child will no longer be conditioned on the majority
will of the constituents in the district.
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cational services will increase the efficiency of the school system.18 3
Additionally, an FC allows separate school districts to develop lowdemand, highly specialized courses without the cost of duplication
in every school district.1 84 In the interest of equal education, an FC
may also incidentally be the most effective means for racial
18 5
integration.
However, an FC does pose difficulties in implementation for
three reasons. Initially, the legislature must determine whether
the plan should be limited to include only public schools, or if private and religious schools could also partake in the system.' 86 Additionally, incorporation of an FC into a system with wide disparities
may result in overcrowding in the best schools or present a difficult
question of student eligibility.18 7 Finally, the radical departure
from the typical school district and the potential breakdown of
l8 8
school districts may pose substantial political difficulty.
All three funding methods are specifically designed to alleviate
or eliminate the inequalities of educational opportunities by either
mandating equal funding or by providing equal access to educational resources. Depending upon the type of problems a state
faces, all three systems present advantages and disadvantages. If
forced to conform to a constitutional standard of equality of educational opportunity, the Illinois General Assembly should choose a
system based on one of these plans. The following section considers
which plan is appropriate for Illinois.
V.

CREATING EQUALITY IN ILLINOIS

The first part of this section will determine which method of
financing most appropriately addresses the inequalities within the
present financing system in Illinois. This will be done by identify183. Id. at 517.
184. Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1141; see also infra note 187 for an argument of the unlikehood that a Family Choice Plan will produce these highly
diverse courses distributed throughout different school districts because such
diversity in limited choice situations fights against the free-market-type model
the family choice plan emulates.
185. Sugarman, supra note 179, at 539-44. Two hypotheticals illustrating
both sides are imaginable: "All whites would flee from integrated programs, set
up private schools, and block entry of black students; or alternatively, blacks
might flock to currently all white suburban and private schools promoting racial integration." Id. at 540. Sugarman suggests that either projection is too
simplistic because pressures exist for either scenario, and an array of alternative possibilities exist. Id.
186. Id. at 520-33.
187. Id. at 536. Such criteria for acceptance would not only be opposed by
constitutional restraints, but would also reduce the amount of choice to the parents, thereby impeding the original focus of the plan. Id. at 536-37.

188. See Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1130 (analyzing the effects of an FC
plan on the school districts).
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ing the overall goals of a new financing system and evaluating
whether any of the three alternative methods for financing can accomplish these goals. The second part of this section will encourage
the Illinois judicial branch to exercise a strong hand in the development of a new system by specifying exactly what the constitutional
mandate requires.
A.

The Objective of a New Method of Finance

There are typically eight ways to define equal educational opportunities.1 8 9 The two most important are equal funding and
equal ability to access educational resources. 19° The fundamental
goal in Illinois is "the educational development of all persons to the
limits of their capacities." 191 Therefore, the objective of a new financing system must be equal access to educational resources for all
students in the state.
Over time, equal access to educational resources can be attained
by providing equal funding per student. Logically, even presently
disparate school districts would eventually offer equal resources
over the course of time.192 Therefore, Illinois can reach both goals
by ensuring equal funding to all students. The following subsections examine the methods of providing equal funding.
189. See John E. McDermott & Stephen P. Klein, The Cost Quality Debatein
School Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 415, 416 (1974) (noting that although defining educational opportunity is a "hazardous undertaking," past judicial attempts to define the term
have produced eight different standards). These standards are as follows: (1)
equal dollars per pupil, (2) dollars adjusted according to pupil needs, (3) lack of
judicially manageable standards, (4) maximum variable ratio, (5) negative standard, (6) inputs, (7) outputs, and (8) minimum adequacy. Id. at 416. The authors explain that the reason for the number of different definitions, all of
which may not be completely satisfactory, is due to the dynamic nature of education. Id. at 416 n.6.
190. These two factors are of primary importance because this Note does not
stress the theory of educational opportunities and the "cost-quality debate," but
stresses the most concrete way to satisfy the constitutional goal and provide a
better educational environment for all children in the state.
191. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
192. This result is conditioned upon the degree that factors such as local
crime, complacency in maintenance, and insurance rates will contribute to the
stagnation of services offered by urban school districts. These factors are traditionally referred to as "municipal overburden," and this is the strongest argument against a fully state funded public school system. Michelson, supra note
171, at 452-53. Michelson argues that such factors are not education issues and
should not factor into a school finance methodology, but should be left to the
municipalities to be dealt with in more appropriate ways. Id. Furthermore,
since other school finance methods also fail to remedy these problems, a fully
state funded system is in no way subordinate to other funding schemes on this

issue. See id. (discussing the FSF plan and its handling of tax issues).
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1. DistrictPower Equalization
A DPE primarily attempts to equalize the available expenditures to each student while still maintaining local control of those
expenditures. 193 Local control of expenditures, built into the system, does allow variations in expenditures depending upon the local
tax effort preferred by the constituents within the school districts.1 9 4 Maintaining local control of expenditures may be the most
politically acceptable to parents. 195 However, the concerns of the
parents are not the primary issue. The educational goal of the Illinois Constitution concerns the needs of the children rather than
the wants of the parents. A DPE system, by continually relying on

local property taxes and by structurally allowing disparities in
funding, proves undesirable and inappropriate to meet the constitutional goal. An alternative is a Voucher or Family Choice Plan.
2.

Voucher Plans or Family Choice Plans

An FC approach to educational equality allows parents to
choose the school they believe is best for their child, theoretically
resulting in substantial advantages for all children. 196 Generally
contrary to traditional reliance on professional educators' judgment, the approach trusts parental judgment and directly offers
equal access to educational facilities. 197 To ensure equal access to
educational facilities, an FC plan must allow parents to choose outof-district public schools (assuming the scope of the FC plan applies
198
only to public schools, excluding private and sectarian schools),
thereby breaking down the present local school district structure.1 99 Since parents would have direct control over their chil193. See COONS ET AL., supra note 20, at 201-42 (describing the finance system of "power equalization" which tends to emphasize local control); see also
Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1129 (discussing the advantage of a DPE funding
system).
194. See COONS ET AL., supra note 20, at 201-42 (parenthetical).
195. See Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1142-43 (recommending a DPE to the
Texas legislature primarily because of its political acceptability).
196. Sugarman, supra note 179, at 513.
197. See id. at 514 (discussing the advantages of the FC plan).
198. Although a Family Choice plan could expand to encompass private and
sectarian schools, allowing parents with the financial ability to send their children to private schools by applying the public school vouchers would only create a two-tiered financially discriminatory system. The likely result would be
that poor children would attend public schools, and middle and upper class children would simply choose to attend private schools. Adding to the problem, the
financial needs of the public schools would no longer be responsive to the entire
state. With political pressure from the middle and upper classes, public school
finances will eventually drop off, seriously undermining the public school
system.
199. Parents, anticipating tax assessments, could opt for the lowest tax rates
within their districts and send their children to the best, fully funded schools.
Vouchers could reflect expenditures on local taxes with supplements paid by
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dren's education, parents would have little need for indirect control
of operations through local school boards.
With a breakdown of school district barriers, funding schools
through local property taxes would become obsolete. 2° ° Therefore,
operation of a successful FC plan ensuring equal access to educational resources requires the state to first institute a fully statefunded system. Additionally, to avoid overcrowding of the presently better equipped public schools, Illinois must first realize the
equalizing effects of a fully state-funded system. 20 '
An FC system focuses on equal access to educational facilities
and therefore parallels the constitutional goal,20 2 provided that an
FC plan produces diverse schools. 20 3 However, although an FC appears attractive, the present disparities render an FC plan unworkable, and the complete breakdown of school district barriers make
an FC plan politically undesirable. 20 4 Thus, the General Assembly
should consider the final plan, Full State Funding.
3. Full State Funding
An FSF method ensures equal funding per student, thereby 2fi05
nancially attempting to guarantee equal educational opportunity.
Initially, an FSF plan does not deliver equal education because of
the pre-existing disparities in resources and facilities. 20 6 However,
the parents. However, this reduces equal access to educational resources by
discriminating against the poor and virtually instituting a solely private school
system.
200. With a breakdown of school district barriers, funding schools through
local taxes would become highly undesirable, most notably to the local property
owners who would not appreciate funding non-local students from other districts with their local property taxes.
201. See supra notes 182-88 for a brief note on the parallel problems due to
overcrowding.
202. See supra note 190 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
overall goal.
203. A Family Choice plan theoretically provides an unlimited number of
schools a child could attend within the limits of the state. However, in reality,
transportation limits the actual number of choices to about three to six schools,
depending upon the density of the area. With a limited number of actual
choices, the market-based family choice plan produces a significantly different
result. From an alternative point of view, the schools themselves have only
limited competition, and compete for only a limited number of students. To
attract a sufficient number of students, schools will need to develop a curriculum tailored to appeal to the general populace. Consequently, this reduces the
incentive to develop the low-demand, highly specialized courses that would be
the essence of the scheme's diversity.
204. See Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1142 (describing this undesirability as
"fear of inter-district desegregation").
205. See Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1129 (outlining the operation of the
FSF plan); see also Michelson, supra note 171, at 457-58 (analyzing the merits of
the FSF plan).
206. See supra note 177 for a comment on the additional problem of "municipal overburden."
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given time, the disparities in facilities and resources should decrease and finally disappear.
The FSF method will have a more immediate impact on an
equal distribution of teaching skills. With equalized funding, both
rich and poor districts will have identical resources to attract higher
qualified educators. 20 7 Furthermore, state response, as opposed to
local response, to the financial needs of education creates better
prospects of increasing the overall quality of education within the
208
state.
Implementation of an FSF plan could also lead to eventual incorporation of an FC plan which not only facilitates equal access to
educational resources, but also allows parents to choose a school
which is tailored to their children's needs.20 9 FSF plans have the
ability to deliver equalized educational opportunity, the potential
for refinement into the highly diversified FC, 210 and the workability to coexist. Together, these characteristics within the school district's present situation, make an FSF plan the best alternative for
the Illinois General Assembly.
B. Judicial Assertion of an AppropriateRemedy
For Illinois to institute an appropriate method of financing
which meets the constitutional mandate, one of two events must
occur. Either the General Assembly must, under its own initiative,
enact a school finance system focusing only on the collective needs
of the children, or the judicial branch must take an assertive role by
specifically instructing the General Assembly as to the type of funding system that will conform to the constitutional restraints.
Trusting the General Assembly to look solely at the needs of
the children is unrealistic for two reasons. First, the political influence of property wealth alone raises questions as to whether the
General Assembly would promulgate an adequate remedy.211 The
present Illinois finance plan demonstrates the General Assembly's
207. Although an area's crime rate and school conditions would play a factor
in how "attractive" a comparative salary would be in a depressed school, with
the present ability to offer competitive salaries coupled with eventual equal facilities and resources, the once "poor" school districts will have an equal ability
to draw quality educators.
208. See Michelson, supra note 171, at 457-58 (discussing the advantages of
the FSF plan).
209. See Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1143-47 (discussing the effects of a
FSF system on the Texas school system).
210. See supra note 198 arguing that an FC plan with the potential to provide diversified schools each offering highly specialized courses, may not actually provide this diversity.
211. See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School FinanceRemedies and State
Courts, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1072, 1078-80 (1991) (discussing various factors hindering constitutional remedies to school financing).
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reluctance to enact a school code that removes advantages of property wealth already built into the system.2 12 This type of reluctance
is seen in other states as well. The Texas Legislature, responding to
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (Edgewood 1)213
which held the Texas public school funding system unconstitutional, proposed a school code which excluded the five percent
of students living in the state's wealthiest school districts from the
equalizing provisions of the new school code. 214 Consequently,
the Texas Supreme Court held that this proposed system is
215
unconstitutional.
Second, the reluctance of the general populace to commit to
higher taxes for the common good of schoolchildren provides no encouragement for the General Assembly to provide an adequate remedy. 216 Taxpayers, likely to underestimate the collective benefits of
a better-educated citizenry and concerned with higher taxes, are
likely to reject a plan that focuses on equal funding. 217 The
problems of trusting the legislature to provide a constitutionally adequate system should prompt the judiciary to abandon its deference
and take an affirmative role in the enactment of a proper financial
plan.
In Edgewood 1,218 the Texas Supreme Court took an affirmative
role by setting forth six general guidelines for the legislature to follow. 219 The Illinois Supreme Court should take a similar affirmative role by outlining the general requirements of a constitutional
school funding system. Some guidelines for a fully state-funded
system are as follows: (1) the new system should not rely on local
tax effort; (2) all children must be afforded equal funds for educational facilities and operations; (3) variations in funding can be al212. See supra notes 144-61 and accompanying text for a discussion the present finance scheme in Illinois and the opt out ability of wealthy districts.
213. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
214. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 495-96 (Tex. 1991).
215. Id. at 496.
216. Note, supra note 211, at 1080.
217. Id.
218. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 391.
219. Id. at 398. These guidelines set forth by the Texas Supreme Court have
been summarized by Manteuffel as follows:
(1) the correlation between a district's tax effort and the funds available for
the children of that district must be direct and close; (2) all children must
be afforded substantially equal access to educational funds; (3) the legislature must provide funding for the school system before allocating other
funds because the education system is mandated constitutionally; (4) the
legislature may act directly or enlist the aid of local governments to meet
its obligation; (5) local communities may supplement their system, but that
enrichment must come from local taxes alone; (6) the system must be overhauled completely, and merely reallocating money between rich and poor
districts under the present system will not suffice.
Manteuffel, supra note 164, at 1127-28.
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lowed if they reflect a child's need (such as disability); (4) control of
operations and procedures and choice of facilities should be left to
local communities through local school boards; and (5) exclusion of
any public school district from the general framework is unacceptable. By setting forth specific guidelines, the Illinois Supreme
Court will increase the state's chances of attaining a constitutionally acceptable public school finance system in the first round of
litigation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Education is an important facet of American society: first, our
democratic system of government depends upon it; second, education provides social and economic mobility, a value adopted by our
country's economic system. Public school finance systems that rely
primarily on local property taxes create educational disparities that
erode a child's ability to rise above his social status. Professional
educators, shifting the blame to "factors out of their control," assert
that poor funding does not inhibit a quality education, but rather
that a child's social and economic environment inhibits education.
However, a poor social and economic environment is more likely a
result of inadequate education rather than a cause of inadequate
education. Because the state directly controls educational funding,
financial equalization is the only effective way to make positive
changes in the disintegration of traditional social values in impoverished communities.
Responding to the need for change, reformers now challenge
the present method of finance in Illinois on constitutional grounds.
With an excellent chance for success on substantive due process
grounds, the suit pending in the First District Appellate Court of
Illinois may force the General Assembly to rebuild the public
school financing scheme in order to conform to constitutional constraints. Through strong guidance by the judicial branch, implementation of a new financing scheme, fully funded by the state, will
not only meet the constitutional mandate, but will also hold potential for refinement. Furthermore, the feasibility of such a plan,
given the school districts' present conditions, makes a fully statefunded financing system appropriate for Illinois.
John F. Watson

